NEWTON / EXPLORER
TESTNET
LIVE
TASKS 24H365 policiesCOMPLIANT100.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED0.04 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 36.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,958,293Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · POLICY CLIENT

0x8fe2…ebc5revision 2 · current

0x8fe204e53d5f7fdd5463a0f03d518f05aec8ebc5 · 1 of 8 policies · Sepolia
POLICY ID
0xfafa15f6…b84a
REVISION
2 of 2
POLICIES
1 of 8
DISTINCT
1
RESPONSE EXPIRY
50 blocks
CHAIN
Sepolia
TASKS · 24H
0
ALLOW RATE
—
Every policy must allowFail-closed, and no short-circuit: every policy is evaluated even after one has denied, and a single denial denies the intent. The response expires 50 blocks after its reference block — the shortest expireAfter in the set, on slot 0.

Policies — 1

one Rego + WASM pair per slot
  1. 0
    0x811feaca33095f5fde8001ed401946e81322f10e0x811f…f10enot in factory registry50 blocksbounds set expiry
    wasmnone — pure Regorego
    — rules— denyno WASMspecHash 0x54b2004b…
    expected_ratifiernot in schema0x4cD178f4DF8244d9DA16a9ca56d9388e06f1aaB3
    max_cumulative_fill_limitnot in schema500000000000000000000000
    policyParams — 121 bytes on chain0x7b2265787065637465645f7261746966696572223a22307834634431373866344446383234346439444131366139636135366439333838653036663161614233222c226d61785f63756d756c61746976655f66696c6c5f6c696d6974223a22353030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030227d
Each module is evaluated against its own input — {"params": <this slot’s policyParams>, "wasm": <this slot’s WASM output>}. There is no shared data.wasm object and no cross-slot namespace, so slot 1 cannot read slot 0’s WASM output and a policy cannot be written to depend on its neighbours.
SET IDENTITY
policyId0xfafa15f674e26788486c71c0b6c4a55f54d034c458b3da7f2036431cf5e7b84a
POLICY_SET_DOMAINkeccak256("newton.policy.set")
chainId11155111
policyClient0x8fe204e53d5f7fdd5463a0f03d518f05aec8ebc5
revision2
policies0x811f…f10e@50
Task managerreads getPolicies() at task creation, then never again
policyId = keccak256(abi.encode(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies)), where policies is the complete ordered array with each entry’s parameters and expiry. Order is part of it, so a reorder alone is a new id.
WHAT A TASK FREEZES
A task carries this exact ordered set as its own snapshot, plus one WASM input per slot. Response validation reads that snapshot and never re-reads the client, so reconfiguring mid-flight cannot change what an in-flight task means — and replay proves it by recomputing the policyId over the snapshot and comparing against the task’s own.
The bound is MAX_POLICIES = 8, enforced on chain and mirrored in the operator, the enclave and the proof guest. An oversize set is rejected, never truncated, and an empty one is rejected too — there is no vacuous allow.

Configuration history

2 writes · newest first
RevPolicy setChangePoliciesConfigured byBlockTasks
2 · current0xfafa15f6…b84aidentical re-apply0x811feaca33095f5fde8001ed401946e81322f10e—11,853,1410x06c3…5eca0
10xa7e81006…1702first set0x811feaca33095f5fde8001ed401946e81322f10e—11,853,1080x116c…33f00
Every write mints a new policyId and revokes every attestation bound to the previous one, because the id commits the client, the chain, the revision counter and the exact ordered list — keccak256(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies). Revision 2 is the only one whose attestations are still spendable. One write here re-applied a byte-identical list. PoliciesUpdated fires anyway and the revision advances anyway, so that write changed nothing about the policies and still killed every outstanding authorization.

Task history — every revision

no tasksExport CSVJSON
No tasks match this scope yet.
The export carries one row per task with the frozen policy set in slot order, and it is the complete filtered history rather than this page. It has no per-policy verdict column: TaskResponse.allowed is a single boolean for the whole set, so which policy denied a task is in no record.