Task 0x301e5159… · Newton Explorer

SENDER

0x00000000…00000099

POLICY CLIENT

0xbe7112ab…c247af5c

POLICY SET

0x94b55057…3c22 · rev 0

POLICIES

0 · 0 with WASM

CHAIN

Sepolia · 11155111

EVALUATION

NON-COMPLIANT

QUORUM

— of stake · threshold 40%

CREATED

2026-10-08 06:54:24 UTC

PROOF STATE

Pending

ATTESTATION EXPIRES

Block —

CHALLENGE WINDOW

Closes block — · 30 blocks

CHALLENGEABLEOpen for challenge until block —.

Anyone may re-evaluate this policy and submit a zero-knowledge proof that the result is wrong — challenge submission is permissionless. A successful challenge voids the attestation and slashes every operator that signed it.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY

06:54:24.466 UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0x301e51595166b9bd732916cb26b18f82c938ee1bfdc69261ef69d9d10a90767dBlock47837083

06:54:24.466 UTCAggregatedQuorum signature aggregated and the response submitted

02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector 0x62757928616464726573732c75696e743235362c75696e74333229 — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)

attestation— — not yet responded

04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED

of operators · — of stake · threshold 40%

Operator	BLS pubkey (G1)	Stake weight	In aggregate

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION

Slot	Policy	WASM output	expireAfter

Which policy denied is not recorded. TaskResponse carries a single bool allowed for the whole set — every policy above was evaluated, and one denial was enough — and no per-policy result. Re-running newt_simulatePolicy against this client returns a per-policy breakdown, but that is a simulation of the set as configured now, not a record of this task.

Each slot links to the policy whose module ran in it. The bytes are from TaskResponse.rego[i], not from the policy’s current CID — every one hashes to that policy’s immutable policyCodeHash, which the chain checks before accepting a response.

07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY

newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x0dbd6e44a1814f5efe4f67a00b7f28642e3064dd --client 0xbE7112ABa3D673E88d4B0B551B857857c247af5c

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block —. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL

Issued 2026-10-08 06:54:24.466 UTC
Receipt hash

Transfer blocked